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COMMENT
STATUTORY STANDARD OF CARE FOR
NORTH CAROLINA HEALTH CARE
PROVIDERS
INTRODUCTION
Malpractice claims against health care providers are occurring
with increasing frequency. Every attorney engaged in the general
practice of law is very likely to be confronted with the unique prob-
lems associated with litigating such claims. Although a malpractice
case is essentially a negligence claim involving the elements of duty,
breach of duty, causation, and damages,' there are additional com-
mon law and statutory elements which must be established.
This comment will examine the North Carolina statutory stan-
dard of care applicable to health care providers. Emphasis is di-
rected to practical aspects. The topics selected for discussion are:
review of relevant statutes, case law requirements to establish the
standard of care, statutory effect of "same or similar community",
obtaining competent expert testimony, viability of national stan-
dards and uniform treatment, and the potential of an absolute
defense as a statutory flaw. Finally, an equitable interpretation is
proposed to eliminate this flaw.
RELEVANT STATUTES
The North Carolina General Assembly enacted new legislation
concerning health care providers during the 1976 second session.2
Under North Carolina General Statute § 90-21.11, a definitional
section, the umbrella of "health care provider" is spread to cover
without limitation any person who pursuant to the provisions of
Chapter 90 of the General Statutes is licensed, or is otherwise
registered or certified to engage in the practice of or otherwise
performs duties associated with any of the following: medicine,
surgery, dentistry, pharmacy, optometry, midwifery, osteopathy,
podiatry, chiropractic, radiology, nursing, physiotheraphy, pathol-
ogy, anesthesiology, anesthesia, laboratory analysis, rendering as-
sistance to a physician, dental hygiene, psychiatry, psychology; or
1. W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 30, at 143 (4th ed. 1971).
2. 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 977 (2d Sess. 1976). The General Assembly en-
acted the legislation on May 12, 1976.
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a hospital as defined by G.S. 131-126.1(3); or a nursing home as
defined by G.S. 130-9(e)(2); or any other person who is legally
responsible for the negligence of such person, hospital or nursing
home; or any other person acting at the direction or under the
supervision of any of the foregoing persons, hospital, or nursing
home.'
Simultaneously, the General Assembly established a statutory
standard of care applicable to all health care providers. This statute
provides:
In any action for damages for personal injury or death arising
out of the furnishing or the failure to furnish professional services
in the performance of medical, dental, or other health care, the
defendant shall not be liable for the payment of damages unless
the trier of the facts is satisfied by the greater weight of the evi-
dence that the care of such health care provider was not in accord-
ance with the standards of practice among members of the same
health care profession with similar training and experience situ-
ated in the same or similar communities at the time of the alleged
act giving rise to the cause of action.'
These statutes are derived from recommendations of the Pro-
fessional Liability Insurance Study Commission. The Commission
was created by the 1975 General Assembly to study malpractice
insurance rates and to submit a written report with recommended
legislation to the General Assembly.' The General Assembly added
the requirement of "similar training and experience" and made
minor changes in the phrasing of the Commission's proposals.' The
changes apparently were intended to conform the statute more
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.11 (Supp. 1977).
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (Supp. 1977). Both provisions became effective
on July 1, 1976, and were inapplicable to pending litigation. 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws
ch. 977, §§ 8, 10 (2d Sess. 1976).
5. 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 623. Two insurance company representatives, two
health professionals, and eight members of the General Assembly, drawn equally
from the House and Senate, composed the committee.
6. The commission's proposed standard of care read: "In any action for dam-
ages for personal injury or death arising out of the furnishing or the failure to
furnish medical, dental, or other health care, the defendant shall not be liable for
the payment of damages unless the trier of facts is satisfied by the greater weight
of the evidence that the care of such health care provider was not in accordance
with the practice and procedures for services which were provided in the same or
similar communities by similar health care providers at the time of the alleged act
giving rise to the cause of action." NORTH CAROLINA PROFESSIONAL INSURANCE STUDY
COMMISSION REPORT note 2, appendix VI, at 3 (March 12, 1976). For a discussion
of the Commission's report and recommendations, see Comment, Medical Mal-
practice in North Carolina, 54 N.C.L. REV. 1214 (1976).
[Vol. 1:111
2
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol1/iss1/4
STANDARD OF CARE
closely with the existing case law standard. In Hunt v. Bradshaw,7
the North Carolina Supreme Court stated: "A physician or surgeon
who undertakes to render professional services must meet these re-
quirements: (1) He must possess the degree of professional learning,
skill and ability which others similarly situated ordinarily possess;
(2) he must exercise reasonable care and diligence in the application
of his knowledge and skill to the patient's case; and (3) he must use
his best judgment in the treatment and care of his patient."8 The
court further provided that if the health care provider meets these
standards, he cannot be held civilly liable; but if he fails to meet
any one of these standards, and his failure proximately causes injury
and damages, he is liable.'
While the new statute does substantially enlarge the number of
professions covered,'0 it does not appear to materially alter the exist-
ing common law standard, which has existed for approximately sev-
enty years." The North Carolina Court of Appeals recently stated
that the statute "clearly shows that the standard of care applicable
to health providers in North Carolina as developed by case law is
now adopted by the legislature."' 2
CASE LAW REQUIREMENTS
Initially a plaintiff must establish that the physician-patient
relationship existed at the time of the alleged acts before a health
care provider can be held to the applicable standard of care and
treatment.' 3 In order to establish liability, there also must be proof
of actionable negligence by the provider which was the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injury.'4
In rare cases, " 'there is manifest such obvious gross want of
care and skill as to afford, of itself, an almost conclusive inference
7. 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762 (1955).
8. Id. at 521, 88 S.E.2d at 765.
9. Id. at 522, 88 S.E.2d at 765.
10. As Chapter 90 licensees, veterinarians, embalmers, and funeral directors
are now deemed to be health care providers by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.11 (Supp.
1977); see N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-187.10 (1975), 90-210.25 (Supp. 1977), respec-
tively.
11. Jackson v. Mountain Sanitarium, 234 N.C. 222, 67 S.E.2d 57 (1951); Wil-
son v. Martin Memorial Hosp., 232 N.C. 362, 61 S.E.2d 102 (1950); Nash v. Roys-
ter, 189 N.C. 408, 127 S.E. 356 (1925); Long v. Austin, 153 N.C. 508, 69 S.E. 500
(1910).
12. Thompson v. Lockert, 34 N.C. App. 1, 5, 237 S.E.2d 259, 261, cert. denied,
293 N.C. 593, 239 S.E.2d 264 (1977).
13. Childers v. Frye, 201 N.C. 42, 158 S.E. 744 (1931).
14. Starnes v. Taylor, 272 N.C. 386, 158 S.E.2d 339 (1968).
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of negligence . . . [that] neither affirmative proof of negligence,
nor expert testimony . . . need be given by the plaintiff.' "'" In the
case quoted above, a physician broke a large bone in the plaintiff's
leg while reducing the fracture of a smaller bone. Plaintiff's leg
became infected, swollen, and eventually burst. After being in-
formed by the plaintiff of the complications, the physician promised
to return to the room in a few minutes. He returned seven days
later. '1
In a more extreme case, the plaintiff, a -healthy, middle-aged
man, was admitted to Duke Hospital for surgery to correct fallen
arches and the resulting pain in his left foot. 7 He was informed that
the surgery would require no more than forty to forty-five minutes
and would involve making a small incision in his back and clipping
a nerve. When the plaintiff was taken into surgery, an eight-inch
anterior incision was made and all of his lower internal organs were
lifted out. While clipping the nerve, the resident performing the
surgery punctured two large veins. Massive bleeding ensued and the
resident punctured other arteries and veins while attempting to
control the blood flow. A chief surgeon, summoned from his home,
examined the plaintiff and determined that the damage was beyond
repair. In an effort to save the plaintiff's life, the surgeon tied the
torn arteries, veins, and fibrous tissue and clipped them en mass.
With the blood supply lost, the left leg developed gangrene and was
amputated below the knee. Gangrene again developed and the knee
joint was amputated. Plaintiff suffered a myocardial infarction.
Later, gangrene developed in his right leg and it too was amputated.
During his stay in the hospital, the plaintiff was administered be-
tween fourteen and seventeen pints of blood. He also became ad-
dicted to drugs. When the plaintiff asked for an explanation of the
operations, the resident's only comment was, " 'I played hell; that
is what happened.' "The court held that the plaintiff's evidence was
sufficient to take the case to the jury.' 8
In the cases discussed above, "[t]he absence of expert medical
testimony, disapproving the treatment or lack of it, is not perforce
fatal to the case. There are many known and obvious facts in the
realm of common knowledge which speak for themselves, sometimes
louder than witnesses, expert or otherwise."' 9
15. Covington v. James, 214 N.C. 71, 74, 197 S.E. 701, 703 (1938) (citations
omitted).
16. Id. at 73, 197 S.E. at 702.
17. Waynick v. Reardon, 236 N.C. 116, 72 S.E.2d 4 (1952).
18. Id. at 119, 121, 72 S.E.2d at 6, 8.
19. Gray v. Weinstein, 227 N.C. 463, 465, 42 S.E.2d 616, 617 (1947).
[Vol. 1:111
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STANDARD OF CARE
Cases which show such gross dereliction and abuse of the pa-
tient are rare. Generally, to establish a prima facie case plaintiff
"must demonstrate by the testimony of a qualified expert that the
treatment administered by defendant was in negligent violation of
the accepted standard of medical care in the community and that
defendant's treatment proximately caused the injury." 0 Proof of
what is approved practice and what constitutes the standard of care
for a health care provider may be established only by the testimony
of a qualified expert.2" Whether an operation should have been per-.
formed on a given patient is also a matter within the realm of expert
testimony.22 Additionally, only an expert can testify to the propriety
of treatment for a disease which is unfamilar to the general public.2 1
When the type of treatment or care provided is not materially
or exclusively within the province of a particular specialty, a pro-
perly qualified general practitioner is a competent expert witness to
testify against a specialist. Here the test is the same as for any other
expert: whether the general practitioner's qualifications exhibit
sufficient knowledge of the subject to permit the jury to consider
his opinion."4 If an expert witness establishes the standard of care
required of the defendant, lay witnesses have been permitted to
testify to the defendant's departure therefrom.25
SAME OR SIMILAR COMMUNITY
"Formerly it was generally held that allowance must be made
for the type of community in which the physician carries on his
practice, and for the fact, for example, that a country doctor could
not be expected to have the equipment, facilities, libraries, con-
tacts, opportunities for learning, or experience afforded by large
cities." 6 The allowance some courts initially made was to compel
the plaintiff's expert witness to reside or practice in the same com-
munity as the defendant in order to testify on the standard to which
the defendant had to conform. This "same locality" rule persisted
in North Carolina until 19702 even though the courts had been
urged to abandon it earlier.H
20. Ballenger v. Crowell, 38 N.C. App. 50, 54, 247 S.E.2d 287, 291 (1978).
21. Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762 (1955).
22. Id.
23. Ballance v. Wentz, 286 N.C. 294, 210 S.E.2d 390 (1974).
24. Pridgen v. Gibson, 194 N.C. 289, 139 S.E. 443 (1927).
25. Jackson v. Mountain Sanitarium, 234 N.C. 222, 67 S.E.2d 57 (1951).
26. W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 32, at 164 (4th ed. 1971).
27. Wiggins v. Piver, 276 N.C. 134, 171 S.E.2d 393 (1970).
28. See Note, Medical Malpractice: Rejection of the "Locality Rule," 46
19791
5
Tyson: Statutory Standard of Care for North Carolina Health Care Provide
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1979
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
In Wiggins v. Piver,9 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
had failed to use due diligence and skill in post-surgical treatment
by allowing incisions in her leg to become infected. She also alleged
that the defendant had not properly aligned the incisions when he
sutured them, causing excessive scarring. At trial, the plaintiff at-
tempted to introduce testimony from a highly qualified surgeon who
resided in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. When asked whether
the defendant had conformed to good medical practice in Jackson-
ville, North Carolina, or similar communities, the surgeon testified
that he was not familiar with the actual practice in Jacksonville but
that he was familiar with standard practice in similar communities.
Defendant's objection was sustained by the trial court who "acted
upon the assumption that the law required the expert to be familiar
with the locality where the alleged improper practices occurred; and
that one who testifies as to his knowledge of similar localities would
not qualify him to give an expert opinion. '30
After reviewing the reasons for the "strict locality" rule,'3 the
court held that the Winston-Salem witness was competent to ex-
press his expert opinion and stated: "Reason does not appear to the
non-medically oriented mind why there should be any essential dif-
ference in the manner of closing an incision, whether performed in
Jacksonville, Kinston, Goldsboro, Sanford, Lexington, Reidsville,
Elkin, Mount Airy, or any other similar community in North Caro-
lina.' 32
Three years later, the court reiterated its position that an ex-
pert's knowledge of practices in similar communities was sufficient
for him to testify on the standard of care in the defendant's com-
munity. In Dickens v. Everhart,33 the plaintiff sought to recover
damages for the wrongful death of his seventeen-year-old daughter
who had succumbed to blood poisoning after having a tooth ex-
tracted. The plaintiff sought to introduce into evidence expert testi-
mony from a pathologist who had practiced in North Carolina, had
treated patients from the defendant's locality, and had familiarized
himself with the general practice of medicine in the defendant's
community. The witness was allowed to testify in detail about his
education, training, and experience. The trial court asked the wit-
ness whether he came to North Carolina after defendant's treatment
N.C.L. REV. 680 (1968).
29. 276 N.C. 134, 171 S.E.2d 393 (1970).
30. Id. at 137, 171 S.E.2d at 395.
31. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
32. 276 N.C. at 138, 171 S.E.2d at 395-96.
33. 284 N.C. 95, 199 S.E.2d 440 (1973).
[Vol. 1:111
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STANDARD OF CARE
of the deceased. When the witness answered affirmatively, the
defendant objected to further testimony. In sustaining the objec-
tion, the trial court stated, "that this man was either a medical
student or an intern in Ohio or somewhere else in 1964. In my view
it is impossible for him to know what is the customary practice in
this case at that time. '3
In reversing the trial court for error in excluding the testimony,
Justice Lake read Wiggins v. Piver5 to hold: "an expert witness,
otherwise qualified, may state his opinion as to whether the treat-
ment and care given by the defendant to the particular patient came
up to the standard prevailing in similar communities, with which
the witness is familiar, even though the witness be not actually
acquainted with actual medical practices in the particular com-
munity in which the service was rendered at the time it was per-
formed."3 The court also stated that "the character of the com-
munity in which the defendant practices is a circumstance to be
considered in determining the degree of skill and ability to be re-
quired of him. '37 A defendant cannot avoid liability, however, by
merely showing "that he possesses the required professional knowl-
edge and skill. He must [also] exercise reasonable diligence in the
application of that.knowledge and skill to the particular patient's
case .... "38
The treatment a defendant provides is judged by, and the ex-
pert's knowledge and opinion must be based on, the prevailing stan-
dards among members of the defendant's profession "with similar
training and experience situated in the same or similar communi-
ties" at the time of a defendant's actions.3" In selecting a medical
expert, a plaintiff must carefully examine the provisions of the sta-
tutory standard. The statute not only states the rule by which a
defendant will be judged, it also sets certain limits which determine
whether the expert's opinion can be considered by the jury. In many
instances, the statutory prerequisites will determine whether the
plaintiff's expert will be allowed to testify at all.
OBTAINING COMPETENT EXPERT TESTIMONY
Rarely will a plaintiff find a qualified expert from the defen-
34. Id. at 98, 199 S.E.2d at 442.
35. See text accompanying notes 29-32 supra.
36. 284 N.C. at 101, 199 S.E.2d at 443.
37. Id., citing W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 166 (3d ed. 1964).
38. Id. at 100, 199 S.E.2d at 443; see Galloway v. Lawrence, 266 N.C. 245, 145
S.E.2d 861 (1966).
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (Supp. 1977).
19791
7
Tyson: Statutory Standard of Care for North Carolina Health Care Provide
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1979
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
dant's community who is willing to testify against the defendant.
This refusal to testify and the tendency to close ranks around a
negligent professional brother has been termed the "conspiracy of
silence." 0 Assuming this conspiracy still exists to some extent
today, a plaintiff must look elsewhere for his expert."
Since the plaintiff will not usually obtain an expert from the
defendant's community, the statute dictates that the expert's testi-
mony will be excluded unless the plaintiff additionally shows that
the expert is familiar with standards of the same profession in
"similar communities.' 2 The end result is that plaintiff's witness,
properly qualified as an expert in his own right, must be further
qualified by showing that he has practiced or has knowledge of
practices in communities that are similar to the defendant's com-
munity.4 3
Relevant characteristics of similarity include the number, size,
and accreditation of hospitals and the number of health care provi-
ders engaged in the defendant's field of practice. Facts indicating
the geographic size, population, general economy of the defendant's
community, as well as its proximity to medical centers or schools,
should also be gathered." These facts and characteristics, compared
with the same characteristics of one or more communities in which
40. See, e.g., Seidelson, Medical Malpractice Cases and the Reluctant Expert,
16 CATH. U.L. REv. 158-60 (1966); Markus, Conspiracy of Silence, 14 CLEVE. MARSH.
L. REV. 520 (1965). See also W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 164 (4th ed.
1971).
41. There are several sources to pursue. The physician who treated the plain-
tiff subsequent to his ordeal with the defendant is a source, if he is willing to testify.
His treatment would be close in time to the defendant's treatment, and his first-
hand observations would be pertinent to plaintiff's present condition. A medical
school or center in the area may also be a source of experts willing to testify.
Further, other attorneys in the area who have handled malpractice claims may be
willing to furnish names of experts they have utilized.
Several commercial and non-profit organizations provide physicians who will
review a plaintiff's medical records and who will express their opinion of whether
the plaintiff possesses a credible malpractice claim. Medical-Legal Consulting
Service, Inc., 8401 Connecticut Avenue, Chevy Chase, Maryland 20012, advertises
this service for a fee. The writer is informed that the American College of Legal
Medicine, 1340 North Astor Street, Suite 2608, Chicago, Illinois 60610, provides
this service free of charge.
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (Supp. 1977); see text accompanying note 4
supra.
43. See, e.g., Horton v. Vickers, 142 Conn. 105, 111 A.2d 675 (1955); Cook v.
Lichtblau, 144 So. 2d 312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Teig v. St. John's Hosp., 63
Wash. 2d 369, 387 P.2d 527 (1963).
44. See, e.g., Michael v. Roberts, 91 N.H. 499, 23 A.2d 361 (1941); Morrill v.
Komasinski, 256 Wis. 417, 41 N.W.2d 620 (1950).
[Vol. 1:111
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the plaintiffs expert has trained or practiced, should lay a sufficient
foundation to establish the witness's familiarity with standards of
practice and thus enable him to testify. One writer has stated "that
the fundamental comparison . . . is the similarity of the expert
witness's knowledge of medical practices and procedures compared
to the defendant's knowledge of these same aspects of the medical
profession."', However, no one characteristic appears to be determi-
native.
An alternative to obtaining an outside expert to testify on the
required standard is to use the defendant as a plaintiff's witness. In
a recent case the plaintiff's adverse examination of the defendant
was sufficient to justify a jury finding that the defendant did not
exercise reasonable diligence in the application of his knowledge
and skill." The deposition of plaintiff's out-of-state expert was ex-
cluded from evidence when it was not shown that the community
he practiced in was similar to that of the defendant. During the
adverse examination, the defendant testified at great length about
the methods and procedures he had followed during.surgery. He also
testified that he did " 'not know definitely what happened to the
vessels, but they were probably cut with the pituitary rongeur.' "
The court stated that the plaintiff had established "the standard of
professional competence and care customary for Diplomates of the
American Board of Orthopedic Surgeons practicing in communities
similar to Salisbury, North Carolina" by calling the defendant as
her witness."' Few plaintiffs will be fortunate enough to have a de-
fendant tie his own noose.
For example, in Koury v. Folio,49 the plaintiff sought to recover
damages from a specialist in pediatrics who had prescribed a drug
for a nine-month-old child. The drug manufacturer's label warned
45. 6 W.F.L. REv. 553, 558 (1970).
46. Thompson v. Lockert, 34 N.C. App. 1, 21, 237;S.E.2d 259, 271, cert.
denied, 293 N.C. 593, 239 S.E.2d 264 (1977).
47. Id. A pituitary rongeur is a hand-operated, spoon-shaped surgical instru-
ment. In this case the defendant used it to remove material from a ruptured disc
in the plaintiff's spine.
48. Id. at 20, 237 S.E.2d at 270. See also Belk v. Schweizer, 268 N.C. 50, 149
S.E.2d 565 (1966). The plaintiff's expert testimony consisted of a thirty-six page
deposition by a physician and an adverse examination by deposition of the defen-
dant. Both were read to the jury. Defendant's evidence included 211 record pages
of testimony by six physicians. After examining the evidence in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, the court held that the plaintiff's evidence was sufficient
to have the jury determine whether the treatment was in accordance with the
required standard of care.
49. 272 N.C. 366, 158 S.E.2d 548 (1968).
1979]
9
Tyson: Statutory Standard of Care for North Carolina Health Care Provide
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1979
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
in red letters, "Not for Pediatric Use." The child became deaf. The
plaintiff's witnesses included an expert in the use of antibiotics in
the treatment of diseases. He testified that the defendant had pre-
scribed almost twice the appropriate amount of the drug in relation
to the baby's body weight. The plaintiff also called an expert in eye,
ear, nose, and throat practice. He testified that the baby was totally
deaf and that anything toxic to a nerve could affect the hearing
nerve. The plaintiff then called the defendant as an adverse witness.
Defendant's opinion was that he had prescribed the standard dosage
used by pediatricians in his community. A nonsuit was entered at
the close of the plaintiffs evidence. s0 In reversing the judgment of
nonsuit, the court held that plaintiff's evidence, if true, would be
sufficient to support a finding that the defendant disregarded ex-
press warnings and prescribed a dosage far in excess of what was
recommended."
There are at least two disadvantages in using an adverse exami-
nation of the defendant to establish the standard of care or depar-
ture therefrom. When a plaintiff introduces testimony during an
adverse examination, the defendant is represented as "worthy of
belief."52 Also, if the plaintiff in Koury 3 had attempted to establish
the standard of care solely by using defendant's testimony, the de-
fendant would have established that he acted in conformity there-
with.
Use of medical treatises or periodicals is another method to
establish the standard of care. The 1977 General Assembly enacted
legislation authorizing admissibility of statements in published
treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets. 4 North Carolina General Stat-
ute § 8-40.1 provides:
In all actions in the superior court to the extent called to the
attention of an expert witness upon cross-examination or relied
upon by him in direct examination, the hearsay rule shall not
exclude statements contained in published treatises, periodicals,
or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or
art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admis-
sion of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial
notice, even though the declarant is available as a witness. If ad-
50. Id. at 368, 158 S.E.2d at 551.
51. Id. at 372, 158 S.E. at 554.
52. Dolan v. Simpson, 269 N.C. 438, 442, 152 S.E.2d 523, 526 (1967); see Cline
v. Atwood, 267 N.C. 182, 147 S.E.2d 885 (1966).
53. See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
54. 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 1116 § 2. The legislation was enacted and effec-
tive on July 1, 1977.
[Vol. 1:111
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mitted, the statements may be read into evidence but may not be
received as exhibits unless agreed to by counsel for the parties. 55
This statute places North Carolina in accordance with the text of
the Federal Rules of Evidence regarding use of published material. 51
Although a pre-statute decision, Stone v. Proctor7 illustrates
practical techniques in the use of published material. Plaintiff es-
tablished the standard of care with a professional journal. The
plaintiff in Stone was treated for a mental disorder by a surgeon who
was also a specialist in the field of psychiatry." Part of the defen-
dant's treatment involved administering electroshock therapy.
After the initial treatment, the plaintiff complained of severe pains
in his lower back. The defendant administered drugs and heat for
the pain; he did not attempt to determine its cause. The defendant
continued the electroshock treatments, increasing their duration
and intensity. The plaintiff was discharged from the hospital still
suffering the backpains. After consulting a radiologist, who x-rayed
the plaintiff, it was determined that his ninth vertebra suffered a
compressed fracture.
On adverse examination, the defendant stated that he was a
Fellow of the American Psychiatric Association and that he sub-
scribed to the American Journal of Psychiatry. Plaintiff identified
as an exhibit a publication which contained Standards for Electro-
shock Treatment. The American Psychiatric Association had ap-
proved these standards a year before the plaintiff was treated. The
defendant testified that he was familiar with these standards. The
court sustained an objection to further answers. In an offer of proof,
the plaintiff asked the defendant whether these standards were the
same he observed in his practice in the community. The defendant
would have answered, " 'yes, generally.' "5 One of the standards
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-40.1 (Supp. 1977). 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 8 amends
this statute by deleting the words "superior court" from the first sentence and
substituting in lieu thereof the words "district and superior courts." The amend-
ment was ratified and effective on February 5, 1979.
56. FED. R. EVID. 803. "The following are not excluded by the hearsay
rule .... (18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert
witness upon cross-examination or relied upon him in direct examination, state-
ments contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of
history, medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the
testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judical
notice. If admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but may not be
received as exhibits." The Federal Rules of Evidence became effective July 1, 1975.
57. 259 N.C. 633, 131 S.E.2d 297 (1963).
58. Psychiatrists and psychologists are health care providers. See text accom-
panying note 3 supra.
59. 259 N.C. at 635, 131 S.E.2d at 298.
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included in the publication was: " 'If the patient should complain
of pain or impairment of function, he should receive a physical
examination, including x-ray, to ascertain whether he has suffered
accidental damage.' ,0 The trial court excluded the question, the
answer, and the standard. At the close of plaintiff's evidence, a
judgment of nonsuit was entered.
On appeal the defendant contended that the trial court was
correct since medical evidence by a specialist in psychiatry was
necessary to establish the standard required and that no specialist
was called to testify. In reversing the judgment of nonsuit, the court
stated:
The defendant was familiar with the standards above referred to.
They were fixed by the Association to which he belonged and in
which he was a Fellow. They applied directly to his specialty and
to the safety of patients undergoing shock treatment. His acknowl-
edgment of their authenticity and their applicability to the
Winston-Salem area were sufficient to warrant their admission in
evidence.'
The new statute regarding the use of published material has not
been interpreted by the supreme court. It is clear that the statute
changes the general common law rule on admissibility of textbooks
or periodicals.2 The texts of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the
North Carolina statute are virtually identical. The various interpre-
tations accorded the federal rule should disclose potential applica-
tions of the North Carolina statutes.
VIABILITY OF NATIONAL STANDARDS AND UNIFORM TREATMENT
Apart from "similar community," the nature of the particular
treatment administered also can have a material bearing on an out-
side witness' competency to testify to the standard of care required
of the defendant. In Rucker v. High Point Memorial Hospital, Inc.,"'
the plaintiff, shot in the leg while hunting, was taken to a general
practitioner in the area who "administered first aid and advised
60. Id.
61. Id. at 636-37, 131 S.E.2d at 299.
62. See Koury v. Follo, 272 N.C. 366, 158 S.E.2d 548 (1968) wherein Justice
Lake stated: "It is well settled in this State ... that excerpts from medical text-
books, and similar publications, are incompetent as evidence to prove the correct-
ness of a statement of fact or theory therein .... [T]he publication is objection-
able both under the Hearsay Rule and under the rules applicable to opinion testi-
mony by expert witnesses."
63: 285 N.C. 519, 206 S.E.2d 196 (1974).
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immediate hospitalization."'" Plaintiff was carried to the emergency
room at High Point Memorial and examined by the surgeon in
charge. After examining the plaintiff and ordering a nurse to
"'[j]ust give him a shot,' ,5 the surgeon told the plaintiff to return
home and apply heat. Over the weekend the pain became unbear-
able and the plaintiff returned to the hospital. A different surgeon
examined and x-rayed his leg. When these x-rays disclosed the pres-
ence of gas gangrene, the plaintiff was transferred to Duke Medical
Center where he underwent numerous operations over several
weeks. The plaintiff permanently lost seventy-five percent of the
functional use of his leg. He sued the High Point hospital and the
emergency room surgeon alleging that the surgeon was employed by
the hospital and that he "held himself out to possess that degree of
skill, ability and learning common to medical practitioners in said
community and similar communities."6 At trial, plaintiff sought to
introduce expert testimony from a surgeon who had practiced in
hospitals in Portsmouth, Virginia, and who was then practicing in
Louisiana and Mississippi and teaching surgery at Tulane Univer-
sity Medical School. The witness would have testified that treat-
ment of shotgun wounds is essentially the same throughout the
United States and "that x-ray examination is required to determine
the extent of the injury and to determine what, if any, operative
.procedures should be followed."" This testimony was excluded be-
cause the witness "was not acquainted with the medical staff at
High Point Memorial Hospital and did not know about its facili-
ties. '6 8 The defendant's motion to dismiss at the close of plaintiff's
evidence was allowed." In awarding a new trial, the court held that
the trial court had committed error in refusing to permit the witness
to testify as an expert for the plaintiff. 0 The court reasoned "that
gunshot wounds of the lower leg lend themselves most readily to
uniform medical and surgical treatment without regard to locality.
Not all injuries are so uniform and the treatment so generally well
known and followed."' Other courts agree, stating that treatment
of fractures, 2 administration of x-rays, 3 and cataract operations 4
64. Id. at 523, 206 S.E.2d at 198.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 521, 206 S.E.2d at 197.
67. Id. at 527, 206 S.E.2d at 201.
68. Id. at 525, 206 S.E.2d at 200.
69. Id. at 526, 206 S.E.2d at 200.
70. Id. at 528-529, 206 S.E.2d at 201.
71. Id. at 527, 206 S.E.2d at 201 (emphasis supplied). Cited as examples were
rattlesnake bites in Alaska and frost bite in Florida.
72. Riley v. Layton, 329 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1964) (applying Utah law).
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are uniform throughout the United States.
After Stone15 and Rucker"8 expert testimony seemingly should
have been admitted without regard to locality if the defendant were
nationally certified or licensed or if the treatment for a given injury
or illness were uniform in any accredited hospital or by any compe-
tent professional. However, the first North Carolina appellate court
to apply these standards since the enactment of the statute balked
when confronted with the issue. In Thompson v. Lockert,77 the
plaintiff sought damages from an orthopedic surgeon alleging that
he had lacerated her left iliac artery and inferior vena cava while
performing a laminectomy diskectomy.78 The defendant was certi-
fied by and a Diplomate of the American Board of Orthopedic Sur-
geons and practiced in Salisbury, North Carolina. The plaintiff for-
warded her medical records to an orthopedic surgeon practicing in
Smithtown, New York. He was also certified by and a Diplomate of
the American Board of Orthopedic Surgeons. The New York surgeon
reviewed these records and testified by deposition. He stated in the
deposition that" 'I have never practiced medicine in North Carolina
and I have never seen the plaintiff, Mrs. Thompson, as a patient
personally.' ,,71 During trial the plaintiff introduced into evidence
the deposition of the defendant, the medical records from the hospi-
tal where the surgery was performed, the deposition of the New York
surgeon, and other documents.
This evidence did not disclose whether Smithtown, New York,
is "similar" to Salisbury, North Carolina, or whether the New York
surgeon was familiar with the standard of care for board certified
orthopedic surgeons practicing in communities similar to Salisbury.
The trial court excluded the New York surgeon's testimony and
granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict."'
Before the court of appeals, the plaintiff argued that the stan-
dard of care applicable to a board certified orthopedic surgeon had
no relation to any geographic community and that Rucker8' had
extended the care required of a specialist to a national standard.
73. McElroy v. Frost, 268 P.2d 273 (Okla. 1954).
74. Hundley v. Martinez, 151 W. Va. 977, 158 S.E.2d 159 (1967).
75. See text accompanying notes 57-61 supra.
76. See text accompanying notes 63-71 supra.
77. 34 N.C. App. 1, 237 S.E.2d 259, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 593, 239 S.E.2d 264
(1977); see text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
78. For a detailed description of the operation by the surgeon who performed
it, see 34 N.C. App. 7-20, 237 S.E.2d 263-270.
79. Id. at 6, 237 S.E.2d at 262.
80. Id. at 3, 237 S.E.2d at 260.
81. See text accompanying notes 63-71 supra.
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The court disagreed and stated that Rucker "was applicable only
to the standard of care of 'accredited hospitals' . . . throughout the
United States. 8 2 In regard to the statutory standard of care the
court stated: "The case law and the legislation reflect the general
policy of both the judicial and legislative branches of the govern-
ment in North Carolina with respect to the standard'of care to be
imposed upon defendant in this case i.e., the 'same or similar com-
munity' rule." Because the statute specifically includes "hospital
as defined by G.S. 131-126.1(3) . . . or any. . . person acting at the
direction or under the supervision of any. . . hospital," 4 the viabil-
ity of Rucker or any application of uniform standards will have to
be determined by the North Carolina Supreme Court.
A FLAW: POTENTIAL ABSOLUTE DEFENSE
One commentator has suggested that the statutory standard of
care is unfair by providing an absolute defense for health care provi-
ders who act in conformity with professional standards.8 5 The com-
ment reasons that until the enactment of the statute, the courts
were free to modify their common law standard on a case-by-case
basis. "Under the. . . legislation, however, a physician who acts in
accordance with standard procedure in the same or similar com-
munity seems to have an absolute defense. 86 Other jurisdictions
have considered whether conformity with standard practice would
provide an absolute defense to a health care provider.
In Favalora v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,8 ' the plaintiff, a
seventy-one-year-old female, fainted and fell to the floor while being
82. 34 N.C. App. at 4, 237 S.E.2d at 261.
83. Id. The plaintiff filed her action on September 16, 1974. The statute
became effective on July 1, 1976, and does not apply to litigation pending on that
date. See text accompanying note 4 supra. The court admitted knowledge of the
effective date in its opinion. 34 N.C. App. at 5, 237 S.E.2d at 261.
The plaintiff also did not introduce into evidence all of the medical records
and x-rays that were before the New York surgeon when he rendered his opinion.
Alternatively, the court ruled that the trial court properly sustained the defen-
dant's objections to the plaintiff's hypothetical questions, and stated: " 'Since it
is the jury's province to find the facts, the data upon which an expert witness bases
his opinion must be presented to the jury in accordance with established rules of
evidence.' Todd v. Watts, 269 N.C. 417, 420, 152 S.E.2d 448, 451 (1967) .. " 34
N.C. App. at 6, 237 S.E.2d at 262.
84. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.11 (Supp. 1977); see text accompanying note 3
supra.
85. Comment, Medicdl Malpractice in North Carolina, 54 N.C.L. REv. 1214,
1222-23 (1976).
86. Id.
87. 144 So.2d 544 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
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x-rayed. She suffered a severe fracture of her right femur. The plain-
tiff had a history of fainting and had fasted the previous day as a
necessity for the tests she was to undergo. Standard practice in the
community did not require the plaintiff's history to be included on
the x-ray request, even though space had been provided. In affirm-
ing the judgment for the plaintiff, the court stated: "We believe that
conformity with the standard of care observed by other medical
authorities in good standing in the same community cannot be
availed of as a defense when the criterion relied upon is shown to
constitute negligence . . . ." The court reasoned further:
To relieve a member of the medical profession from liability for
injury to a patient on the ground that he followed a degree or
standard of care practiced by others ...is, in our opinion, un-
thinkable when the degree or standard of care in question is shown
to constitute negligence because it fails to meet the test of reasona-
ble care and diligence required of the medical profession. To hold
otherwise is to exempt one from even willful negligence on the
patently unsound ground that others in the same profession do
likewise. Such instances, in our judgment, do not involve errors of
judgment or diagnosis occasioned by a disparity of innate skill and
ability against which the law affords the physician protection, but
rather constitutes failure of the physician to exercise reasonable
care and diligence along with his best judgment in his application
to the patient of the degree of skill of which he is possessed.89
The court wanted no misinterpretation of its opinion: "We are firm
in the opinion that it is patently absurd, unreasonable and arbitrary
to hold that immunity from tort liability may be predicated upon a
degree of care or procedure amounting to negligence notwithstand-
ing such procedure is generally followed by other members of the
profession in good standing ... "0
In Helling v. Carey,"' the Washington Supreme Court held as
a matter of law that health care providers were negligent in con-
forming with standard practice. The plaintiff, a thirty-two-year-
old female, initially consulted the defendants for nearsightedness
and was fitted with contactlenses. The defendants were specialists
in ophthalmology. Over the next nine years she consulted the defen-
dants for eye irritation. Until her last visit, the defendants assumed
the plaintiff's irritation related solely to her use of the contacts.
During the last visit, a pressure test disclosed the presence of glau-
88. Id. at 550.
89. Id. at 551.
90. Id.
91. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
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coma, a progressive disease with few symptoms. Without a pressure
test, glaucoma is generally undetected until extensive and irreversi-
ble loss of vision has occurred. During the trial, it was established
by unanimous expert testimony for the plaintiff and the defendants
"that the standards of the profession for that specialty in the same
or similar circumstances do not require routine pressure tests for
glaucoma upon patients under 40 years of age . . . [since] the
disease rarely occurs in this age group."9 From a verdict for the
defense the plaintiff appealed, contending that the standard of care
for ophthalmologists was inadequate to protect her from the incid-
ence of glaucoma. The defendants contended the standard was ade-
quate because of the rarity of the disease in patients under forty.9 1
In awarding a new trial on the issue of damages only, the court held:
Under the facts of this case reasonable prudence required the
timely giving of the pressure test to this plaintiff. The precaution
of giving this test to detect the incidence of glaucoma to patients
under 40 years of age is so imperative that irrespective of its disre-
gard by the standards of the opthalmology profession, it is the duty
of the courts to say what is required to protect patients under 40
from the damaging results of glaucoma.,
We therefore hold, as a matter of law, that the reasonable
standard that should have been followed under the undisputed
facts of this case was the timely giving of this simple, harmless
pressure test to this plaintiff and that, in failing to do so, the
defendants were negligent, which proximately resulted in the
blindness sustained by the plaintiff for which the defendants are
liable."
These courts reserved the right to judge the reasonableness of the
defendant's conduct, and did not blindly follow the professional
standards down the road to absolute defense. 5
92. Id. at __ , 519 P.2d at 982.
92. Id. It was stated that glaucoma occurs in about 1 out of 25,000 people
under forty years of age.
94. Id. at -, 519 P.2d at 983 (emphasis supplied).
95. In Gates v. Jensen, 20 Wash. App. 81, 579 P.2d 374 (1978), the Washington
Court of Appeals held that WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.290 abolished the Helling rule.
This statute provides in part: "In any civil action for damages based on professional
negligence . . . the plaintiff in order to prevail shall be required to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant or defendants failed to exercise
that degree of skill, care and learning possessed by other persons in the same
profession and that as a proximate result of such failure the plaintiff suffered
damages. .. ." The court stated: "The statute by its express terms clearly requires
a departure from the standard of the profession to sustain recovery in a medical
malpractice case." Id. at -, 579 P.2d at 376. However, the attorney for the
1979]
17
Tyson: Statutory Standard of Care for North Carolina Health Care Provide
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1979
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
Over 75 years ago, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled
that it was not bound by standards set by the local profession.
Locally established standards were not conclusive evidence of pro-
per care and treatment. In McCracken v. Smathers," the plaintiff
brought a malpractice action against a dentist, alleging negligence
both in filling a tooth with a live nerve without proper packing and
in boring unnecessarily through the jawbone. The jury awarded $500
to the plaintiff." The defendant appealed, contending that he could
not be held liable if he exercised the degree of skill and care that
was exercised by other dentists in the neighborhood. The supreme
court disagreed and affirmed the judgment, stating that members
of a profession in a given area "might be men of very inferior qualifi-
cations, and to say that they might set themselves up as the stan-
dard of learned profession, and prove the standing of each by the
ability of the other, would be equally unjust to the profession and
to its patients. '9 8
While the North Carolina courts recognize that a health care
provider will not be held liable for an honest error in judgment,"
Hunt v. Bradshaw requires the provider to "exercise reasonable
care," and to "use his best judgment. in the treatment and care of
his patient."0 These requirements may place the provider in a di-
lemma. If the provider's best judgment is that adherence to stan-
dard treatment would further complicate an ailment, liability may
result if he fails to deviate from standard practice and further injury
occurs. The plaintiff could assert that the provider failed to exercise
reasonable care according to his best judgment. If the provider does
deviate and further injury occurs, the plaintiff could assert that the
statute required the provider to act in conformity with standard
practice.
CONCLUSION
While the court should not hastily impose its own determina-
tion of standard practice over those schooled in a profession,
plaintiff in Gates informs the writer that the Washington Supreme Court granted
certiorari in this case during December, 1978. Oral arguments are scheduled for
March, 1979.
96. 122 N.C. 799, 29 S.E. 354 (1898).
97. 122 N.C. at 800. (The amount of the damages is not reported in S.E.)
98. Id. at 803, 29 S.E. at 355.
99. Belk v. Schweizer, 268 N.C. 50, 56, 149 S.E.2d 565, 570 (1960); Kennedy
v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 358, 90 S.E.2d 754, 756 (1956).
100. 242 N.C. 517, 521, 88 S.E.2d 762, 765 (1955).
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Hunt's'01 requirements of reasonable care and best judgment, and
the disregard of local professional standards from McCracken,"'2
support preservation of the court's right to judge whether profes-
sional standards constitute negligence. By according conclusive
weight to professional standards and providing an absolute defense
to a defendant, the court abrogates its duty to determine negligent
conduct and freezes the standard to a level lower than that which
should be available to patients.
The following interpretation of the statute would enhance the
maintenance of sound health care standards and would be equitable
to both plaintiffs and defendants: a presumptive defense is granted
if the health care provider acts in conformity with the professional
standard of care in similar communities. Nothing else appearing,
the provider is absolved of liability. However, if the professional
standard is unreasonable under the circumstances, the court may
determine that the standard constitutes negligence as a matter of
law.
JOHN MARSH TYSON
101. See text accompanying notes 7-9, 21-22, 99 supra.
102. See text accompanying notes 95-97 supra.
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